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Abstract
We study the question of how to compute a point in the convex hull of an input set S of n points in
Rd in a differentially private manner. This question, which is trivial without privacy requirements,
turns out to be quite deep when imposing differential privacy. In particular, it is known that the
input points must reside on a fixed finite subset G ⊆ Rd, and furthermore, the size of S must grow
with the size of G. Previous works [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 11] focused on understanding how n needs to grow
with |G|, and showed that n = O
(
d2.5 · 8log∗ |G|
)
suffices (so n does not have to grow significantly
with |G|). However, the available constructions exhibit running time at least |G|d2 , where typically
|G| = Xd for some (large) discretization parameter X, so the running time is in fact Ω(Xd3).
In this paper we give a differentially private algorithm that runs in O(nd) time, assuming that
n = Ω(d4 logX). To get this result we study and exploit some structural properties of the Tukey
levels (the regions D≥k consisting of points whose Tukey depth is at least k, for k = 0, 1, . . . ). In
particular, we derive lower bounds on their volumes for point sets S in general position, and develop
a rather subtle mechanism for handling point sets S in degenerate position (where the deep Tukey
regions have zero volume). A naive approach to the construction of the Tukey regions requires nO(d2)
time. To reduce the cost to O(nd), we use an approximation scheme for estimating the volumes
of the Tukey regions (within their affine spans in case of degeneracy), and for sampling a point
from such a region, a scheme that is based on the volume estimation framework of Lovász and
Vempala [14] and of Cousins and Vempala [7]. Making this framework differentially private raises a
set of technical challenges that we address.
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1 Introduction
We often would like to analyze data while protecting the privacy of the individuals that
contributed to it. At first glance, one might hope to ensure privacy by simply deleting all
names and ID numbers from the data. However, such anonymization schemes are proven
time and again to violate privacy. This gave rise of a theoretically-rigorous line of work
that has placed private data analysis on firm foundations, centered around a mathematical
definition for privacy known as differential privacy [8].
Consider a database S containing personal information of individuals. Informally, an
algorithm operating on such a database is said to preserve differential privacy if its outcome
distribution is (almost) insensitive to any arbitrary change to the data of one individual
in the database. Intuitively, this means that an observer looking at the outcome of the
algorithm (almost) cannot distinguish between whether Alice’s information is x or y (or
whether Alice’s information is present in the database at all) because in any case it would
have (almost) no effect on the outcome distribution of the algorithm.
I Definition 1.1 (Dwork et al. [8]). Two databases (multisets) S and S′ are called neighboring
if they differ in a single entry. That is, S = S0 ∪ {x} and S′ = S0 ∪ {y} for some items x
and y. A randomized algorithm A is (ε, δ)-differentially private if for every two neighboring
databases S, S′ and for any event T we have
Pr[A(S) ∈ T ] ≤ eε ·Pr[A(S′) ∈ T ] + δ.
When δ = 0 this notion is referred to as pure differential privacy, and when δ > 0 it is
referred to as approximate differential privacy.
I Remark 1.2. Typically, ε is set to be a small constant, say ε = 0.1, and δ is set to be a
small function of the database size |S| (much smaller than 1/|S|). Note that to satisfy the
definition (in any meaningful way) algorithm A must be randomized.
Differential privacy is increasingly accepted as a standard for rigorous treatment of privacy.
However, even though the field has witnessed an explosion of research in the recent years,
much remains unknown and answers to fundamental questions are still missing. In this
work we study one such fundamental question, already studied in [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 11]: Given a
database containing points in Rd (where every point is assumed to be the information of
one individual), how can we privately identify a point in the convex hull of the input points?
This question, which is trivial without privacy requirements, turns out to be quite deep when
imposing differential privacy. In particular, Bun et al. [5] showed that in order to be able to
solve it, we must assume that the input points reside on a fixed finite subset G ⊆ Rd, and
furthermore, the number of input points must grow with the size of G.
The Private Interior Point (PIP) Problem.
Let β, ε, δ,X be positive parameters where β, ε, δ are small and X is a large integer. Let
G ⊆ [0, 1]d be a finite uniform grid with side steps 1/X (so |G| = (X + 1)d). Design an
algorithm A such that for some n ∈ N (as small as possible as a function of β, ε, δ,X)
we have
1. Utility: For every database S containing at least n points from G it holds that
A(S) returns a point in the convex hull of S with probability at least 1− β. (The
outcome of A does not have to be in G.)
2. Privacy: For every pair of neighboring databases S, S′, each containing at least n
points from G, and for any event T , we have Pr[A(S) ∈ T ] ≤ eε ·Pr[A(S′) ∈ T ] + δ.
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The parameter n is referred to as the sample complexity of the algorithm. It is the
smallest number of points on which we are guaranteed to succeed (not to be confused with
the actual size of the input). The PIP problem is very natural on its own. Furthermore,
as was observed in [2], an algorithm for solving the PIP problem can be used as a building
block in other applications with differential privacy, such as learning halfspaces and linear
regression. Previous works [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 11] have focused on the task of minimizing the
sample complexity n while ignoring the runtime of the algorithm. In this work we seek an
efficient algorithm for the PIP problem, that still keeps the sample complexity n “reasonably
small” (where “reasonably small” will be made precise after we introduce some additional
notation).
1.1 Previous Work
Several papers studied the PIP problem for d = 1. In particular, three different constructions
with sample complexity 2O(log∗ |G|) were presented in [3, 4, 5] (for d = 1). Recently, Kaplan
et al. [11] presented a new construction with sample complexity O((log∗ |G|)1.5) (again, for
d = 1). Bun et al. [5] gave a lower bound showing that every differentially private algorithm
for this task must have sample complexity Ω(log∗ |G|). Beimel et al. [2] incorporated a
dependency in d to this lower bound, and showed that every differentially private algorithm
for the PIP problem must use at least n = Ω(d+ log∗ |G|) input points.
For the case of pure differential privacy (i.e., δ = 0), a lower bound of n = Ω(logX) on
the sample complexity follows from the results of Beimel et al. [1]. This lower bound is tight,
as an algorithm with sample complexity n = O(logX) (for d = 1) can be obtained using a
generic tool in the literature of differential privacy, called the exponential mechanism [16].
We sketch this application of the exponential mechanism here. (For a precise presentation of
the exponential mechanism see Section 2.1.) Let G = {0, 1X , 2X , . . . , 1} be our (1-dimensional)
grid within the interval [0, 1], and let S be a multiset containing n points from G. The
algorithm is as follows.
1. For every y ∈ G define the score qS(y) = min {|{x ∈ S | x ≥ y}|, |{x ∈ S | x ≤ y}|} .
2. Output y ∈ G with probability proportional to eε·qS(y).
Intuitively, this algorithm satisfies differential privacy because changing one element of S
changes the score qS(y) by at most ±1, and thus changes the probabilities with which we
sample elements by roughly an eε factor. As for the utility analysis, observe that ∃y ∈ G
with qS(y) ≥ n2 , and the probability of picking this point is (at least) proportional to eεn/2.
As this probability increases exponentially with n, by setting n to be big enough we can
ensure that points y′ outside of the convex hull (those with qS(y′) = 0) get picked with very
low probability.
Beimel et al. [2] observed that this algorithm extends to higher dimensions by replacing
qS(y) with the Tukey depth tdS(y) of the point y with respect to the input set S (the Tukey
depth of a point y is the minimal number of points that need to be removed from S to ensure
that y is not in the convex hull of the remaining input points). However, even though there
must exist a point y ∈ Rd with high Tukey depth (at least n/(d+ 1); see [15]), the finite grid
G ⊆ Rd might fail to contain such a point. Hence, Beimel et al. [2] first refined the grid G
into a grid G′ that contains a point with high Tukey depth, and then randomly picked a
point y from G′ with probability proportional to eε·tdS(y). To compute the probabilities with
which grid points are sampled, the algorithm in [2] explicitly computes the Tukey depth of
every point in G′, which, because of the way in which G′ is defined, results in running time of
at least Ω(|G|d2) = Ω(Xd3) and sample complexity n = O(d3 log |G|) = O(d4 logX). Beimel
et al. then presented an improvement of this algorithm with reduced sample complexity of
n = O(d2.5 · 8log∗ |G|), but the running time remained Ω(|G|d2) = Ω(Xd3).
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1.2 Our Construction
We give an approximate differentially private algorithm for the private interior point problem
that runs in O(nd) time,1 and succeeds with high probability when the size of its input is
Ω(d4ε log
X
δ ). Our algorithm is obtained by carefully implementing the exponential mechanism
and reducing its running time from Ω(|G|d2) = Ω(Xd3) to O(nd). We now give an informal
overview of this result.
To avoid the need to extend the grid and to calculate the Tukey depth of each point in
the extended grid, we sample our output directly from [0, 1]d. To compute the probabilities
with which we sample a point from [0, 1]d we compute, for each k in an appropriate range,
the volume of the Tukey region of depth k, which we denote as Dk. (That is, Dk is the region
in [0, 1]d containing all points with Tukey depth exactly k.) We then sample a value k ∈ [n]
with probability proportional to Vol(Dk) · eεk, and then sample a random point uniformly
from Dk.
Observe that this strategy picks a point with Tukey depth k with probability proportional
to Vol(Dk) · eεk. Hence, if for a “large enough” value of k (say k ≥ ncd for a suitable absolute
constant c > 1) we have that Vol(Dk) is “large enough”, then a point with Tukey depth k
is picked with high probability. However, if Vol(Dk) = 0 (or too small) then a point with
Tukey depth k is picked with probability zero (or with too small a probability). Therefore,
to apply this strategy, we derive a lower bound on the volume of every non-degenerate Tukey
region, showing that if the volume is non-zero, then it is at least Ω
(
1/Xd3
)
.
There are two issues here. The first issue is that the best bound we know on the complexity
of a Tukey region is O(n(d−1)bd/2c), so we cannot compute these regions explicitly (in the
worst-case) in time O(nd) (which is our target runtime complexity). We avoid the need
to compute the Tukey regions explicitly by using an approximation scheme for estimating
the volume of each region and for sampling a point from such a region, a scheme that is
based on the volume estimation framework of Lovász and Vempala [14] and of Cousins and
Vempala [7]. The second issue is that it might be the case that all Tukey regions for large
values of k are degenerate, i.e., have volume 0, in which case this strategy might fail to
identify a point in the convex hull of the input points.
Handling degeneracies. We show that if the Tukey regions of high depth are degenerate,
then many of the input points must lie in a lower-dimensional affine subspace. This can
be used to handle degenerate inputs S as follows. We first (privately) check whether there
exists an affine proper subspace that contains many points of S. If we find such a subspace
f , we recursively continue the procedure within f , with respect to S ∩ f . Otherwise, if no
such subspace exists, then it must be the case that the Tukey regions of high depth are
full-dimensional (with respect to the subspace into which we have recursed so far), so we
can apply our algorithm for the non-degenerate case and obtain a point that lies, with high
probability, in the convex hull of the surviving subset of S, and thus of the full set S.
We remark that it is easy to construct algorithms with running time polynomial in the
input size n, when n grows exponentially in d. (In that case one can solve the problem using
a reduction to the 1-dimensional case.) In this work we aim to reduce the running time while
keeping the sample complexity n at most polynomial in d and in log |G|.
1 When we use O-notation for time complexity we hide logarithmic factors in X, 1/ε, 1/δ, and polynomial
factors in d. We assume operations on real numbers in O(1) time (the so-called real RAM model).
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2 Preliminaries
We assume that our input set S consists of n points that lie in the intersection of a grid G
with the cube [0, 1]d in Rd. We assume that G is of side length 1/X for a given accuracy
integer parameter X, so it partitions the cube into Xd cells.
2.1 The exponential mechanism
Let G∗ denote the set of all finite databases over a grid G, and let F be a finite set. Given a
database S ∈ G∗, a quality (or scoring) function q : G∗ ×F → N assigns a number q(S, f) to
each element (S, f) ∈ G∗ ×F , identified as the “quality” of f with respect to S. We say that
the function q has sensitivity ∆ if for all neighboring databases S and S′ and for all f ∈ F
we have |q(S, f)− q(S′, f)| ≤ ∆.
The exponential mechanism of McSherry and Talwar [16] privately identifies an element
f ∈ F with large quality q(S, f). Specifically, it chooses an element f ∈ F randomly, with
probability proportional to exp (ε · q(S, f)/(2∆)). The privacy and utility of the mechanism
are:
I Theorem 2.1 (McSherry and Talwar [16]). The exponential mechanism is (ε, 0)-differentially
private. Let q be a quality function with sensitivity ∆. Fix a database S ∈ G∗ and let
OPT = maxf∈F {q(S, f)}. For any β ∈ (0, 1), with probability at least (1−β), the exponential
mechanism outputs a solution f with quality q(S, f) ≥ OPT− 2∆ε ln |F |β .
2.2 Tukey depth
The Tukey depth [18] tdS(q) of a point q with respect to S is the minimum number of
points of S we need to remove to make q lie outside the convex hull of the remaining subset.
Equivalently, tdS(q) is the smallest number of points of S that lie in a closed halfspace
containing q. We will write td(q) for tdS(q) when the set S is clear from the context. It easily
follows from Helly’s theorem that there is always a point of Tukey depth at least n/(d+ 1)
(see, e.g., [15]). We denote the largest Tukey depth of a point by tdmax(S) (the maximum
Tukey depth is always at most n/2).
We define the regions D≥k(S) =
{
q ∈ [0, 1]d | tdS(q ≥ k
}
and Dk(S) = D≥k(S) \
D≥k+1(S) for k = 0, . . . , tdmax(S). Note that D≥1 is the convex hull of S and that
D≥0 = [0, 1]d. It is easy to show that D≥k is convex; D≥k is in fact the intersection
of all (closed) halfspaces containing at least n− k+ 1 points of S; see [17]. It is easy to show
that all this is true also when S is degenerate. See Figure 1 for an illustration. The following
lemma is easy to establish.
I Lemma 2.2. If D≥k is of dimension d (we refer to such a region as non-degenerate) then
Ck = ∂D≥k(S) is a convex polytope, each of whose facets is contained in a simplex σ spanned
by d points of S, such that one of the open halfspaces bounded by the hyperplane supporting
σ contains exactly k − 1 points of S.
3 The case of general position
As already said, we apply the exponential mechanism for privately identifying a point in
[0, 1]d with (hopefully) large Tukey depth with respect to the input set S. This satisfies (pure)
differential privacy since the sensitivity of the Tukey depth is 1. In this section we show
that when the input points are in general position, then this application of the exponential
mechanism succeeds (with high probability) in identifying a point that has positive Tukey
depth, that is, a point inside the convex hull of S.
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D≥2
Figure 1 The Tukey layers D≥2 and D≥1.
To implement the exponential mechanism (i.e., to sample a point from [0, 1]d appropri-
ately), we need to compute the Tukey regions D≥k and their volumes. In this section we
compute these regions explicitly in O
(
n1+(d−1)bd/2c
)
time. In Section 5 we will show that
the cost can be reduced to O(nd).
Computing D≥k. We pass to the dual space, and construct the arrangement A(S∗) of the
hyperplanes dual to the points of S. A point h∗ dual to a hyperplane h supporting D≥k
has at least n− k + 1 dual hypeplanes passing below h∗ or incident to h∗, or, alternatively,
passing above h∗ or incident to h∗. Furthermore, if we move h∗ slightly down in the first
case (resp., up in the second case), the number of hypeplanes below (resp., above) it becomes
smaller than n− k + 1.
When h∗ is a vertex of A(S∗) we refer to it as k-critical, or simply as critical. If D≥k is
non-degenerate then, by Lemma 2.2, each hyperplane h that supports a facet of D≥k must
be spanned by d affinely independent points of S. That is, all these hyperplanes are dual to
k-critical vertices of A(S∗).
We compute all critical dual vertices that have at least n−k+ 1 dual hyperplanes passing
below them or incident to them, or those with at least n− k + 1 dual hyperplanes passing
above them or incident to them. The intersection of the appropriate primal halfspaces that
are bounded by the hyperplanes corresponding to these dual vertices is D≥k. This gives an
algorithm for constructing D≥k when it is non-degenerate. Otherwise D≥k is degenerate and
its volume is 0, and we need additional techniques, detailed in the next subsection, to handle
such situations.
We compute the volume of each non-degenerate D≥k, for k = 1, . . . , tdmax(S). We do
that in brute force, by computing and triangulating D≥k and adding up the volumes of the
simplices in this triangulation. Then we subtract the volume of D≥k+1 from the volume of
D≥k to get the volume of Dk.
The sampling mechanism. We assign to each Dk the weight eεk/2 and sample a region Dk,
for k = 0, . . . , tdmax(S), with probability
µk =
eεk/2Vol(Dk)∑
j≥0 eεj/2Vol(Dj)
,
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where Vol(Dk) denotes the volume of Dk. Then we sample a point uniformly at random
from Dk. We do this in brute force by computing Dk, triangulating it, computing the volume
of each simplex, drawing a simplex from this triangulation with probability proportional to
its volume, and then drawing a point uniformly at random from the chosen simplex.2
This is an instance of the exponential mechanism in which the score (namely the Tukey
depth) has sensitivity 1, i.e., |tdS(q)− tdS′(q)| ≤ 1 for any point q ∈ [0, 1]d, when S and S′
differ by only one element. It thus follows from the properties of the exponential mechanism
(Theorem 2.1) that this procedure is (purely) ε-differentially private.
Complexity. Computing the dual arrangement A(S∗) takes O(nd) time [10]. Assume that
D≥k is non-degenerate and let Mk denote the number of hyperplanes defining D≥k (i.e.,
the hyperplanes supporting its facets). It takes O(Mbd/2ck ) time to construct D≥k, as the
intersection of Mk halfspaces, which is a dual version of constructing the convex hull (see [6]).
Within the same asymptotic bound we can triangulate D≥k and compute its volume. We
obviously have Mk = O(nd), but the number can be somewhat reduced. The following
lemma is known.
I Lemma 3.1 (Proposition 3 in [13]). The number of halfspaces needed to construct D≥k is
O(nd−1).
Proof. Fix a (d− 1)-tuple σ of points of S, and consider all the relevant (closed) halfspaces,
each of which is bounded by a hyperplane that is spanned by σ and another point of S, and
contains at least n− k + 1 points of S. It is easy to check that, as long as the intersection of
these halfspaces is full-dimensional, it is equal to the intersection of just two of them. J
Summing up, we get that computing the volume of all the non-degenerate regions D≥k,
for k = 1, . . . , tdmax(S), takes O
(∑
k≥1M
bd/2c
k
)
= O
(
n1+(d−1)bd/2c
)
time.
Utility. We continue to assume that D≥k is non-degenerate, and give a lower bound on
its volume. By Lemma 2.2, such a D≥k is the intersection of halfspaces, each bounded by
a hyperplane that is spanned by d points of S. Denote by H the set of these hyperplanes.
To obtain the lower bound, it suffices to consider the case where D≥k is a simplex, each of
whose vertices is the intersection point of d hyperplanes of H.
The equation of a hyperplane h that passes through d points, a1, . . . , ad, of S is∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1 x1 · · · xd
1 a1,1 · · · a1,d
...
1 ad,1 · · · ad,d
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 0,
where ai = (ai,1, . . . , ai,d), for i = 1, . . . , d. The coefficients of the xi’s in the equation of
h are d× d subdeterminants of this determinant, where each determinant has one column
of 1’s, and d − 1 other columns, each of whose entries is some ai,j , which is a rational of
the form m/X, with 0 ≤ m ≤ X (the same holds for the 1’s, with m = X). The value of
such a determinat (coefficient) is a rational number with denominator Xd. By Hadamard’s
2 A simple way to implement the last step is to draw uniformly and independently d points from [0, 1],
compute the lengths λ1, . . . , λd+1 of the intervals into which they partition [0, 1], and return
∑d+1
i=1 λivi,
where v1, . . . , vd+1 are the vertices of the simplex.
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inequality, its absolute value is at most the product of the Euclidean norms of its rows,
which is at most dd/2. That is, the numerator of the determinant is an integer of absolute
value at most dd/2Xd. The free term is a similar sub-determinant, but all its entries are the
ai,j ’s, so it too is a rational with denominator Xd, and with numerator of absolute value at
most dd/2Xd. Multiplying by Xd, all the coefficients become integers of absolute value at
most dd/2Xd.
Each vertex of any region Dk of Tukey depth k, for any k, is a solution of a linear
system of d hyperplane equations of the above form. It is therefore a rational number
whose denominator, by Cramer’s rule, is the determinant of all non-free coefficients of the d
hyperplanes. This is an integer whose absolute value, again by Hadamard’s inequality, is
at most(√
ddd/2Xd
)d
≤ dd(d+1)/2Xd2 .
Since the free terms are also integers, we conclude that the coordinates of the intersection point
are rationals with a common integral denominator of absolute value at most dd(d+1)/2Xd2 .
We can finally obtain a lower bound for the nonzero volume of a simplex spanned by any
d+ 1 linearly independent intersection points v1, . . . , vd+1. This volume is
1
d!
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1 v1,1 · · · v1,d
1 v2,1 · · · v2,d
...
1 vd+1,1 · · · vd+1,d
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ,
where again vi = (vi,1, . . . , vi,d), for i = 1, . . . , d+ 1. Note that all the entries in any fixed row
have the same denominator. The volume is therefore a rational number whose denominator
is d! times the product of these denominators, which is thus an integer with absolute value
at most
d! ·
(
dd(d+1)/2Xd
2
)d
≤ (dX)d3
(for d ≥ 2). That is, we get the following lemma.
I Lemma 3.2. If the volume of D≥k is not zero then it is at least 1/(dX)d
3 .
Assume that the volume of D≥k is not zero for k = k0 := n/(4d). Since the score of a
point outside the convex hull is zero and the volume of D≥0 is at most 1, we get that the
probability to sample a point outside of the convex hull is at most
1
eεk0Vol(Dk0)
≤ (dX)
d3
eεn/(4d)
.
This inequality leads to the following theorem, which summarizes the utility that our instance
of the exponential mechanism provides.
I Theorem 3.3. If n ≥ 4d
4 log(dX)
ε
+ 4d
ε
log 1
β
and D≥n/4d has non-zero volume then the
exponential mechanism, implemented as above, returns a point in the convex hull with
probability at least 1− β, in O (n1+(d−1)bd/2c) time.
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4 Handling degeneracies
In general we have no guarantee that D≥n/4d has non-zero volume. In this section we show
how to overcome this and compute (with high probability) a point in the convex hull of any
input. We rely on the following lemma, which shows that if D≥k has zero volume then many
points of S are in a lower-dimensional affine subspace.
I Lemma 4.1. If D≥k spans an affine subspace f of dimension j then
|S ∩ f | ≥ n− (d− j + 1)(k − 1).
Proof. Recall that D≥k is the intersection of all closed halfspaces h that contain at least
n−k+1 points of S. Note that a halfspace that bounds D≥k and whose bounding hyperplane
properly crosses f , defines a proper halfspace within f , and, by assumption, the intersection
of these halfspaces has positive relative volume. This means that the intersection of these
halfspaces in Rd has positive volume too, and thus cannot confine D≥k to f . To get this
confinement, there must exist (at least) d− j + 1 halfspaces in the above collection, whose
intersection is f . Hence the union of their complements is Rd \ f . Since this union contains
at most (d− j + 1)(k − 1) points of S, the claim follows. J
In what follows, to simplify the expressions that we manipulate, we use the weaker lower
bound n− (d−j+1)k. In order for the lemma to be meaningful, we want k to be significantly
smaller than the centerpoint bound n/(d+ 1), so we set, as above, k = n/(4d).
We use Lemma 4.1 to handle degenerate inputs S, using the following high-level approach.
We first (privately) check whether there exists an affine proper subspace that contains many
points of S. If we find such a subspace f , we recursively continue the procedure within f ,
with respect to S ∩ f . Lemma 4.1 then implies that we do not lose too many points when
we recurse within f (that is, |S ∩ f | is large), using our choice k = n/(4d). Otherwise, if no
such subspace exists, Lemma 4.1 implies that D≥k is full-dimensional (with respect to the
subspace into which we have recursed so far), so we can apply the exponential mechanism, as
implemented in Section 3, and obtain a point that lies, with high probability, in the convex
hull of the surviving subset of S, and thus of the full set S. We refer to this application of the
exponential mechanism in the appropriate affine subspace as the base case of the recursion.
The points of S ∩ f are not on a standard grid within f . (They lie of course in the
standard uniform grid G of side length 1/X within the full-dimensional cube, but G ∩ f is
not a standard grid and in general has a different, coarser resolution.) We overcome this issue
by noting that there always exist j coordinates, which, without loss of generality, we assume
to be x1, . . . , xj , such that f can be expressed in parametric form by these coordinates. We
then project f (and S ∩ f) onto the x1x2 · · ·xj-coordinate subspace f ′. We recurse within
f ′, where the projected points of S ∩ f do lie in a standard grid (a cross-section of G), and
then lift the output point x′0, which lies, with high probability, in conv(S′0), back to a point
x′ ∈ f . It is straightforward to verify that if x′0 is in the convex hull of the projected points
then x′ is in the convex hull of S ∩ f .
4.1 Finding an affine subspace with many points privately
For every affine subspace f , of dimension 0 ≤ j ≤ d− 1, spanned by some subset of (at least)
j + 1 points of G, we denote by c(f) the number of points of S that f contains, and refer to
it as the size of f .
We start by computing c(f) for every subspace f spanned by points of S, as follows. We
construct the (potentially degenerate) arrangement A(S∗) of the set S∗ of the hyperplanes
dual to the points of S. During this construction, we also compute the multiplicity of each
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flat in this arrangement, namely, the number of dual hyperplanes that contain it. Each
intersection flat of the hyperplanes is dual to an affine subspace f defined by the corresponding
subset of the primal points of S (that it contains), and c(f) is the number of dual hyperplanes
containing the flat. In other words, as a standard byproduct of the construction of A(S∗),
we can compute the sizes of all the affine subspaces that are spanned by points of S, in O(nd)
overall time.
We define
Mi = Mi(S) = max{c(f) | f is spanned by a subset of S and is of dimension at most i},
and compute M ′i = Mi + Yi, where Yi is a random variable drawn (independently for each
i) from a Laplace distribution with parameter b := 1ε centered at the origin. (That is, the
probability density function of Yi is 12be−|x|/b =
ε
2e
−ε|x|.)
Our algorithm now uses a given confidence parameter β ∈ (0, 1) and proceeds as follows.
If for every j = 0, . . . , d− 1
M ′j ≤ n− (d− j + 1)k −
1
ε
log 2
β
, (1)
we apply the base case. Otherwise, set j to be the smallest index such that
M ′j > n− (d− j + 1)k −
1
ε
log 2
β
. (2)
Having fixed j, we find (privately) a subspace f of dimension j that contains a large
number of points of S. To do so, let Zj be the collection of all j-dimensional subspaces that
are spanned by j + 1 affinely independent points of the grid G (not necessarily of S). We
apply the exponential mechanism to pick an element of Zj , by assigning a score s(f) to each
subspace of Zj , which we set to be
s(f) = max {0, c(f)−Mj−1} ,
if j ≥ 1, and s(f) = c(f) if j = 0. Note that by its definition, s(f) is zero if f is not spanned
by points of S. Indeed, in this case the c(f) points contained in f span some subspace of
dimension ` ≤ j − 1 and therefore Mj−1 must be at least as large as c(f). We will shortly
argue that s(f) has sensitivity at most 2 (Lemma 4.4), and thus conclude that this step
preserves the differential privacy of the procedure.
We would like to apply the exponential mechanism as stated above in time proportional
to the number of subspaces of non-zero score, because this number depends only on n (albeit
being exponential in d) and not on (the much larger) X. However, to normalize the scores to
probabilities, we need to know the number of elements of Zj with zero score, or alternatively
to obtain the total number of subspaces spanned by j+ 1 points of G (that is, the size of Zj).
We do not have a simple expression for |Zj | (although this is a quantity that can be
computed, for each j, independently of S, once and for all), but clearly |Zj | ≤ Xd(j+1). We
thus augment Zj (only for the purpose of analysis) with Xd(j+1) − |Zj | “dummy” subspaces,
and denote the augmented set by Z ′j , whose cardinality is now exactly Xd(j+1). We draw a
subspace f from Z ′j using the exponential mechanism. To do so we need to compute, for
each score s ≥ 0, the number Ns of elements of Z ′j that have score s, give each such element
weight eεs/4, choose the index s with probability proportional to Nseεs/4, and then choose
uniformly a subspace from those with score s. It is easy to check that this is indeed an
implementation of the exponential mechanism as described in Section 2.1.
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If the drawing procedure decides to pick a subspace that is not spanned by points of S,
or more precisely decides to pick a subspace of score 0, we stop the whole procedure, with a
failure. If the selected score is positive, the subspace to be picked is spanned by j + 1 points
of S, and those subspaces are available (from the dual arrangement construction outlined
above). We thus obtain a selected subspace f (by randomly choosing an element from the
available list of these subspaces), and apply the algorithm recursively within f , restricting
the input to S ∩ f . (Strictly speaking, as noted above, we apply the algorithm to a projection
of f onto a suitable j-dimensional coordinate subspace.)
It follows that we can implement the exponential mechanism on all subspaces in Z ′j
in time proportional to the number of subspaces spanned by points of S, which is O(nd),
and therefore the running time of this subspace selection procedure (in each recursive call)
is O(nd).
4.1.1 Privacy analysis
I Lemma 4.2. Let S1 = S0 ∪ {x} and S2 = S0 ∪ {y} be two neighboring data sets. Then,
for every i = 0, . . . , d− 1, we have |Mi(S1)−Mi(S2)| ≤ 1.
Proof. Let f be a subspace of dimension at most i that is spanned by points of S1 and
contains Mi(S1) such points. If f does not contain x then f is also a candidate for Mi(S2),
so in this case Mi(S2) ≥Mi(S1). If f does contain x then S1∩f \{x} ⊆ S0 spans a subspace
f ′ of f which is of dimension at most i, so it is a candidate for Mi(S2). Since it does not
contain x (and may contain y) we have in this case that Mi(S2) ≥Mi(S1)− 1. Therefore
we can conclude that in anycase Mi(S2) ≥Mi(S1)− 1. A symmetric argument shows that
Mi(S1) ≥Mi(S2)− 1. Combining these two inequalities the lemma follows. J
I Lemma 4.3. The value of each M ′i , for i = 0, . . . , d− 1, is ε-differentially private.
Proof. This follows from standard arguments in differential privacy (e.g., see [9, 19]), since,
by Lemma 4.2, Mi is of sensitivity 1 (in the sense shown in the lemma). J
Since we choose j by comparing each of the M ′j ’s to a value which is the same for
neighboring data sets S1 and S2 (which have the same cardinality n), Lemma 4.3 implies
that the choice of the dimension j is differentially private.
The next step is to choose the actual subspace f in which to recurse. The following
lemma implies that this step too is differentially private.
I Lemma 4.4. Let S1 and S2 be as in Lemma 4.2. Then, for each j = 0, . . . , d− 1 and for
every subspace f ∈ Z ′j, we have |sS1(f)− sS2(f)| ≤ 2.
Proof. Fix j and f ∈ Z ′j . Clearly, |cS1(f)− cS2(f)| ≤ 1, and, by Lemma 4.2, Mj−1 is also
of sensitivity 1, and the claim follows. J
I Lemma 4.5. The subspace-selection procedure described in this section (with all its recursive
calls) is 2d2ε-differentially private.
Proof. By Lemma 4.3 the computation of each M ′i is ε-differentially private, and by
Lemma 4.4 the exponential mechanism on the scores s(f) is also ε-differentially private.
Since we compute at most d values M ′i at each step, and we recurse at most d times, the
claim follows by composition [9, 19]. J
I Remark 4.6. We can save a factor of d in Lemma 4.5 by using a framework called the
sparse vector technique, see e.g., [9].
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4.1.2 Utility analysis
The following lemma is the key for our utility analysis.
I Lemma 4.7. Let β ∈ (0, 1) be a given parameter. For k = n4d and for every j = 0, . . . , d−1
the following properties hold.
(i) If Mj ≥ n− (d− j + 1)k then, with probability at least 1− β,
M ′j ≥ n− (d− j + 1)k −
1
ε
log 2
β
.
(ii) On the other hand, if Mj ≤ n− (d− j + 1)k − 2ε log 2β , then, with probability at least
1− β,
M ′j ≤ n− (d− j + 1)k −
1
ε
log 2
β
.
Proof. (i) follows since the probability of the Laplace noise Yj to be smaller than − 1ε log 2β
is at most β, and (ii) follows since the probability of Yj to be larger than 1ε log
2
β is also at
most β. J
We say that (the present recursive step of) our algorithm fails if one of the complements
of the events specified in Lemma 4.7 happens, that is, the step fails if for some j, either (i)
Mj ≥ n−(d−j+1)k andM ′j < n−(d−j+1)k− 1ε log 2β , or (ii)Mj ≤ n−(d−j+1)k− 2ε log 2β
and M ′j > n − (d − j + 1)k − 1ε log 2β . Otherwise we say that (this step of) our algorithm
succeeds.3
It follows from Lemma 4.1 that if the algorithm succeeds and applies the base case then
D≥k is full dimensional. Furthermore, if the algorithm succeeds and decides to recurse
on a subspace of dimension j (according to the rule in (1) and (2)) then, for every ` < j,
M` ≤ n− (d− `+ 1)k and Mj ≥ n− (d− j + 1)k − 2ε log 2β . The following lemma is an easy
consequence of this reasoning.
I Lemma 4.8. If the algorithm succeeds, with dimension j, and applies the exponential
mechanism to pick a j-dimensional subspace, then there exists a j-dimensional subspace
f with score s(f) = Mj −Mj−1 ≥ k − 2ε log 2β . Furthermore, if k ≥ 8d
2
ε logX +
8
ε log
1
β
then, with probability at least 1 − β, the exponential mechanism picks a subspace f with
s(f) ≥Mj −Mj−1 − k2 ≥ k2 − 2ε log 2β .
Proof. The first part of the lemma follows from the definition of success, as just argued. For
the second part notice that, since |Z ′j | ≤ Xd
2 , the probability of drawing a subspace f ′ ∈ Z ′j
of score smaller than Mj −Mj−1 − k2 is at most
Xd
2 · e
ε(Mj−Mj−1−k/2)/4
eε(Mj−Mj−1)/4
= Xd
2 · e−εk/8 .
This expression is at most β if k ≥ 8d2ε logX + 8ε log 1β . J
3 Note that there is a “grey zone” of values of Mj between these two bounds, in which the step always
succeeds.
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If follows that if our algorithm succeeds and recurses in a subspace f of dimension j then,
with probability at least 1− β,
c(f) ≥Mj−1 + s(f) ≥Mj − k2
≥ n− (d− j + 1)k − 2
ε
log 1
β
− k2 ≥ n−
(
d− j + 32
)
k − 2
ε
log 1
β
.
That is, when we recurse in f of dimension j we lose at most
(
d− j + 32
)
k + 2ε log
1
β
points. Denote by d0 = d, d1, . . . , dt the sequence of dimensions into which the procedure
recurses (reaching the base case at dimension dt ≥ 0). Hence, keeping k fixed throughout
the recursion, at the r-th recursive step we lose at most
(
dr − dr+1 + 32
)
k + 2ε log
1
β points.
Summing up these losses over r = 0, . . . , t− 1, the total loss is at most
(d0 − dt)k + 32kt+
2t
ε
log 1
β
≤ 5d2 · k +
2d
ε
log 1
β
.
Substituting k = n4d , we get that the total number of points that we loose is at most
2n
3
if n = Ω
(
d
ε log
1
β
)
, with a sufficiently large constant of proportionality.
Notice that we keep k fixed throughout the recursion and n may decrease. Consequently,
if n′ is the number of points in some recursive call in some dimension ` < d, then n′ ≥ n3
and therefore k = n4d ≤ 3n
′
4d which is still smaller than the centerpoint guarantee of
n′
`+1 .
As described, our subspace-selection procedure (with all its recursive calls) is 2d2ε-
differentially private. Dividing ε by 2d2 we get that our subspace-selection procedure is
ε-differentially private, and that the total number of points we lose is much smaller than n if
n = Ω
(
d3
ε log
1
β
)
.
Recall Section 3, where we showed that we need n = Ω
(
d4 log dX
ε
)
for the (ε-differentially
private) base case to work correctly. (Recall also that the base case is actually applied in
a suitable projection of the terminal subspace onto some coordinate-frame subspace of the
same dimension, and that the above lower bound on n suffices for any such lower-dimensional
instance too.)
The following theorem summarizes the result of this section.
I Theorem 4.9. If n = Ω
(
d4 log dX
ε +
d3 log 1β
ε
)
, our algorithm (including all recursive calls
and the base case) is ε-differentially private, runs in O
(
n1+(d−1)bd/2c
)
time, and finds a
point of depth at least k = n4d with probability at least 1− 2d2β.
Proof. The privacy statement follows by composition, using Lemma 4.5 and the privacy
properties of the exponential mechanism. The confidence bound follows since the probability
of failure of the recursive call in a subspace of dimension j is at most (j + 1)β. The running
time of the algorithm is dominated by the running time of the exponential mechanism that
we perform at the bottom (base case) of the recursion. J
5 An O(nd) algorithm via volume estimation
The upper bound on the running time in Theorem 4.9 is dominated by the running time of
the base case, in which we compute all the regions D≥` explicitly, which takes nO(d
2) time.
To reduce this cost, we use instead a mechanism that (a) estimates the volume of Dk to a
sufficiently small relative error, and (b) samples a random point “almost” uniformly from Dk.
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We show how to accomplish (a) and (b) using the volume estimation mechanisms of Lovász
and Vempala [14] and later of Cousins and Vempala [7]. We also show how to use these
procedures to implement approximately the exponential mechanism described in Section 3.
These algorithms are Monte Carlo, so they fail with some probability, and when they fail we
may lose our ε-differential privacy guarantee. As a result, the modified algorithm will not be
purely differentially private, as the one in Section 3, and we will only be able to guarantee
that it is (ε, δ)-differentially private, for any prescribed δ > 0. The following theorem is our
main result. We prove it in the full version of this paper [12].
I Theorem 5.1. Given n = Ω
(
d4 log dXδ
ε
)
points, our algorithm (including all recursive calls
and the base case) is (ε, δ)-differentially private, runs in O
(
nd
)
time, and finds a point of
depth at least k = n4d with probability at least 1− δ.
6 Conclusions
We gave an O(nd)-time algorithm for privately computing a point in the convex hull of
Ω(d4 logX) points with coordinates that are multiples of 1/X in [0, 1]. Even though this gives
a huge improvement of what was previously known and requires some nontrivial technical
effort, and sophisticated sampling and volume estimation tools, this running time is still not
satisfactory for large values of d. The main hurdle in improving it further is the nonexistence
of efficient algorithms for computing Tukey depths and Tukey levels.
The main question that we leave open is whether there exists a differentially private
algorithm for this task which is polynomial in n and d? (when the input size, n, is still
polynomial in logX and d).
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